Timothy Bryar and Arnie Saiki
July 5, 2016
The concept of fragility is often considered to be non-applicable to the Pacific region. With notable exceptions, as in the ongoing violence in West Papua and the immigration detention facitilities in Manus and Nauru, armed violence and conflict has been relatively absent from the regional landscape. Rather, concepts of security and stability in the region tend to be considered from a perspective that is intimately linked to concerns with climate change, with rapid rates of urbanization, and with widening socio-economic disparities, including very high rates of gender based violence.
Although there is no universally agreed-upon definition of state fragility, there are a number of different indices and frameworks to assess the fragility of states across the region and globe. The number of Pacific Island states that qualify (and I use this term quite deliberately as will become evident later) as ‘fragile’ differs across the different indices. For example, using a combination of existing indices[1] the OECD identify five fragile Pacific Island Countries – Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. Kiribati has appeared on the OECD’s list of fragile states every year since 2007. The Asia Development Bank’s fragility assessment identifies one additional fragile Pacific state, Nauru. The ADB index also shows that whilst PNG and Vanuatu show aspects of fragility they are nonetheless not considered to be fragile. The 2016 Global Peace Index on the other hand ranks PNG as only the 99th most peaceful country out of 163, which ranks it alongside Uganda, Sri Lanka, Guinea, and Angola. Curiously, based on the ADB index, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu are considered to be as fragile as Afghanistan[2]. The g7+ grouping of 20 fragile and conflict affected countries includes only two Pacific countries (PNG and Solomon Islands) in its membership.
Measuring Fragility
Perhaps the obvious question that arises here is how is fragility actually assessed? What are the factors that determine whether a country is considered fragile or not? In 2015 the OECD developed a new approach to measuring fragility which replaces the traditional notion of ‘fragile states’ with the concept of ‘states of fragility’ which recognizes the multidimensional and changeable nature of fragility. The index has five dimensions: (i) violence; (ii) access to justice; (iii) effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions; (iv) economic foundations; and (v) capacity to adapt to social, economic, and environmental shocks and disasters. The links between this index and SDG16 are readily apparent: SDG 16 is to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. The g7+ was key in negotiating SDG 16 based on its own previously established ‘Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals’ under the ‘New Deal’ which include legitimate politics based on inclusive political settlements; security, including people’s security; access to justice; economic foundations; and revenues and services, including accountable and fair service delivery. ADB’s fragility assessment is similar, consisting of four core dimensions (economic, state, security and peace, and conflict and justice) plus two additional dimensions to capture environmental and climate change risks. The following description from an ADB assessment helps understand how this translates to Pacific Island fragility:
Tuvalu, one of the smallest and the most remote countries on the planet, has limited land area (26 square kilometres) and a small population of about 10,000. The nation hardly achieves and sustains any economic growth at all. It faces challenges like a narrow economic base, dependence on imports, exposure to volatility in global markets, heavy reliance on income from external sources, high risk of debt distress, and limited human and financial resources. The generally inefficient public sector is the main driver of growth, while the private sector is small, restricted by high transport costs and with limited opportunities for entrepreneurial activities. Development is further hampered by public policy on land, which limits land ownership to natives, and weak institutions make most land transactions informal. Tuvalu is also one of the world’s most vulnerable countries to the effects of climate change, mainly shrinking space due to sea level rise, which is exacerbated by a growing population, neglect of traditional resource management practices, unsustainable use of natural resources, and poor waste management and pollution control[3].
In short, understanding fragility is less about conflict and violence and more about the conditions which promote and sustain development, and therefore there is an emphasis on the role of government and their institutions in the determination of fragility. As the Centre for American Progress[4] write, “Fragile states are best viewed as countries with weak or illegitimate institutions and limited governing capacity”. Therefore, from a donor perspective, the issue of fragility draws attention to the challenges of aid effectiveness in countries which face fragile situations. For the Pacific region particular structural factors (e.g. geography) make it vulnerable to issues such as climate change and environmental disasters which pose a different set of governance challenges. The inclusion of such factors may shift the emphasis of governance on building resilience. For example, the findings of the 2016 Global Peace Index report indicate that while the frequency of shocks and disasters do not discriminate between high and low positive peace countries, natural disasters lead to 13 times more deaths in countries where positive peace and resilience are low.
So what?
At this point some readers may be asking the ‘so what?!’ question. Why does an assessment of fragility matter? What benefit does it provide to the sustainable development of the region and to Pacific Island countries themselves? Noting some difficulties and gaps in obtaining accurate data, the OECD highlights that aid for fragile states continues to grow and that since 2007 more than half of global ODA has been allocated to states and economies on the fragile states list[5]. The OECD expects country programmable aid to fragile states to exceed that given to all other developing countries by 2017. Furthermore, according to the OECD, Pacific Island countries fill four of the top five spots on the list of most aid-dependent countries and economies – all four are considered fragile states. One may wonder about the chicken and egg and whether fragility leads to aid-dependence or vice versa. Nonetheless, what these facts might suggest is that a perspective on fragility that is more sensitive to the particular vulnerabilities of the Pacific region may open up access to development financing for more Pacific Island countries. It is perhaps in this vein that Alex van Trotsenburg (Vice President of development finance at the World Bank) stated recently at Unlocking Opportunities in Fragile Markets workshop in Dublin, Ireland that the issues Pacific Island Countries face with climate change means the definition of “fragile” as used in development finance context must now include the Pacific Island Countries and address the specific situations and fragility. In response, the Forum Secretary General Dame Meg Taylor welcomed this acknowledgement and shift in defining the meaning of “fragile” and anticipates that this will ensure the appropriate support for PIC by Development Finance institutions.
A Regional Approach to Fragility
From a development partner or donors perspective, relying on global indices to assess and respond to fragility is considered to be less relevant than taking the specific local context as the starting point for fragility assessments[6]. This includes taking an approach that involves local stakeholders in a participatory and inclusive assessment process. While such an approach is no doubt important for the implementation of development projects at the country level it does raises questions as to the applicability of a regional approach to fragility in the Pacific. Nonetheless, it is worth considering how fragility could be constructed for the Pacific and, more importantly, what perspective of Pacific fragility would help realise development outcomes for the region.
Indeed, in contrast to the localised approach just mentioned one could argue that regardless of their individual ‘fragility status’ all Pacific Islands share in the fragility of the region. Issues over the loss of fresh water, land, ocean acidification, fisheries depletion, radioactive waste, militarization and a slew of other degradations add to the disparities unique to Pacific Islands.[7] Emphasising the region’s ‘common constraints’ in this way can provide the basis for a regional approach to fragility. An example of how this has been done elsewhere is the approach being undertaken by the g7+ in relation to the SDG. The g7+ has identified a range of relevant indicators across the SDG, selecting three key indicators from SDG16 and one indicator from each of the other 16 goals that together provide a multi-dimensional measurement of fragility.
Perhaps something similar could be done in this region in order to develop a Pacific approach to fragility. That is, rather than seeking to expand the global indicators of fragility to be inclusive of the Pacific, the Pacific could use the SDG to define fragility for the region and seek support for a regional approach to implementation. Indeed, there would appear to be donor support for such an approach. For example, the Swedish International Development Agency is increasing its presence in the region and has stated that its focus is on strictly regional action that integrates the priorities of climate, environment, human rights, democracy and gender – all relevant components of a Pacific perspective of fragility.
We would argue that there is one SDG target that warrants greater attention by the Pacific, and which can provide a source of deeper regional integration based on cultural and environmental statistics: target 15.9 which states, “By 2020, integrate ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and accounts”. This target directly links to the way that Pacific fragility can be accounted for in national accounts. Such activities take place under a global set of standards for measuring economic activity (e.g., they are used to determine a country’s economy ) as defined by The Systems of National Accounts[8] (SNA).
Within the SNA, a new environmental and economic framework has been recently adopted: the System of Environmental and Economic Accounting[9] (SEEA), and an Experimental Ecosystem Accounting (EEA) program is being tested to meet the objectives for integrating “environmental information into standard measures of economic activity”[10].
At present, SNA and SEEA do not adequately provide for the key fragility issues of the Pacific (this point is perhaps a symptom of the fact that the Pacific is not represented on the UN Statistical Commission, except as observers). The Pacific could implement revisions to these data standards with the purpose of highlighting the value of shared resources – not only of commodity resources like fish and minerals, but also on the value-added customary stewardship and the protection of resources that are sacrosanct of the health, human rights and biodiversity of the Pacific region.
Such a task would require significant investments to develop the regional technical capacity to implement an ecological and human rights based statistical methodology. Pacific Island countries have tremendous statistical equity in their own right and as it is now, the economic and ecological mapping necessary to approach regional statistical analysis, will require a significant level of data disaggregation to ensure that Pacific peoples and countries do not get left behind, and perhaps more importantly, that our interests and needs are appropriately valued and accounted for.
[1] Results were compiled from two lists: (i) World-Bank-African Development Bank-Asian Development Bank Harmonized list of Fragile Situations; and (ii) Fragile States Index developed by The Fund for Peace.
[2] http://blogs.adb.org/blog/small-beautiful-fragile-pacific
[3] http://blogs.adb.org/blog/small-beautiful-fragile-pacific
[4] Norris, J. (2016). A Better Approach to Fragile States: The Long View. Centre for American Progress https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2016/06/22/139897/a-better-approach-to-fragile-states/
[5] http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/development/states-of-fragility-2015_9789264227699-en#page61
[6] http://blogs.adb.org/blog/let-s-rethink-how-we-work-fragile-states
[7] http://imipono.org/2016/03/05/regional-integration-and-self-determination/
[8] http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna.asp
[9] http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/seea.asp
[10] http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/eea_project/default.asp